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ABSTRACT 
 
Feature extraction and feature selection are the first tasks in pre-processing of input logs in order to detect 
cyber security threats and attacks while utilizing machine learning. When it comes to the analysis of 
heterogeneous data derived from different sources, these tasks are found to be time-consuming and difficult 
to be managed efficiently. In this paper, we present an approach for handling feature extraction and 
feature selection for security analytics of heterogeneous data derived from different network sensors. The 
approach is implemented in Apache Spark, using its python API, named pyspark. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Today, a perimeter-only security model in communication system is insufficient. With the Bring 
Your Own Device (BYOD) and IoT, data now move beyond the perimeter. For example, threats 
to the intellectual property and generally to sensitive data of an organization, are related either to 
insider attacks, outsider targeted attacks, combined forms of internal and external attacks or 
attacks, performed over a long period. Adversaries can be either criminal organizations, care- less 
employees, compromised employees, leaving employees or state-sponsored cyber espionage [6]. 
 
The augmentation of cyber security attacks during the last years emerges the need for automated 
traffic log analysis over a long period of time at every level of the enterprise or organizations 
information system. Unstructured, semi- structured or structured data in time-series with respect 
to security-related events from users, services and the underlying network infrastructure usually 
present a high level of large dimensionality and non-stationarity.  
 
There is a plethora of examples in the literature as well as in open-source or commercial threat 
detection tools where machine learning algorithms are used to correlate events and to apply 
predictive analytics in the cyber security landscape.  
 
Incident correlation refers to the process of comparing different events, often from multiple data 
sources in order to identify patterns and relationships enabling identification of events belonging 
to one attack or, indicative of broader malicious activity. It allows us to better understand the 
nature of an event, to reduce the workload needed to handle incidents, to automate the 
classification and forwarding of incidents only relevant to a particular consistency and to allow 
analysis to identify and reduce potential false positives.  
 
Predictive Analytics, using pattern analysis, deals with the prediction of future events based on 
previously observed historical data, by applying methods such as Machine Learning [9]. For 
example, a supervised learning method can build a predictive model from training data to make 
predictions about new observations as it is presented in [7].  
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We need to build autonomous systems that could act in response to an attack in an early stage. 
Intelligent machines could implement algorithms designed to identify patterns and behaviors 
related to cyber threats in real time and provide an instantaneous response with respect to their 
reliability, privacy, trust and overall security policy framework.  
 
By utilizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques leveraged by machine learning and data 
mining methods, a learning engine enables the consumption of seemingly unrelated disparate 
datasets, to discover correlated patterns that result in consistent outcomes with respect to the 
access behavior of users, network devices and applications involved in risky abnormal actions, 
and thus reducing the amount of security noise and false positives. Machine learning algorithms 
can be used to examine, for example, statistical features or domain and IP reputation as it 
proposed in [1] and [12].  
 
Along with history- and user-related data, network log data are exploited to identify abnormal 
behavior concerning targeted attacks against the underlying network infrastructure as well as 
attack forms such as man-in-the-middle and DDoS attacks [3] [9].  
 
Data acquisition and data mining methods, with respect to different types of attacks such as 
targeted and indiscriminate attacks, provide a perspective of the threat landscape. It is crucial to 
extract and select the right data for our analysis, among the plethora of information produced 
daily by the information system of a company, enterprise or an organization [8]. Enhanced log 
data are then analyzed for new attack patterns and the outcome, e.g. in the form of behavioral risk 
scores and historical baseline profiles of normal behavior is forwarded to update the learning 
engine. Any unusual or suspected behavior can then be identified as an anomaly or an outlier in 
real or near real-time [11]. 
 
We propose an approach to automate the tasks of feature extraction and feature selection using 
machine learning methods, as the first stages of a modular approach for the detection and/or 
prediction of cybersecurity attacks. For the needs of our experiments we employed the Spark 
framework and more specifically its python API, pyspark. 
 
Section 2 explains the difficulties of these tasks especially while working with heterogeneous data 
taken from different sources and of different formats. In section 3 we explain the difference 
between two common approaches in feature extraction by utilizing machine learning techniques. 
Section 4 deals with the task of extracting data from logs of increased data complexity. In section 
5 we propose methods for the task of feature selection, while our conclusions are presented in 
section 6. 
 
2. EXTRACTING AND SELECTING FEATURES FROM HETEROGENEOUS DATA 
 
In our experiments, we examine the case where we have logs of records derived as the result of an 
integration of logs produced by different network tools and sensors (heterogeneous data from 
different resources). Each one of them monitors and records a view of the system in the form of 
records of different attributes and/or of different structure, implying thus an increased level of 
interoperability problems in a multi-level, multi-dimensional feature space; each network 
monitoring tool produces its own schema of attributes.  
 
In such cases, it is typical that the number of attributes is not constant across the records, while 
the number of complex attributes varies as well [8]. On the other hand, there are attributes, e.g., 
dates, expressed in several formats, or other attributes referred to the same piece of information 
by using slightly different attribute names. Most of them are categorical, in a string format while 
the inner datatype varies from nested dictionaries, linked lists or arrays of further complex 
structure; each one of them may present its own multi-level structure which increases the level of 
complexity. In such cases, a clear strategy has to be followed for feature extraction. Therefore, we 
have to deal with flattening 1 and interoperability solving processes (Figure 1). 
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In our experiments, we used as input data an integrated log of recorded events produced by a 
number of different network tools, applied on 
stage was used a single server of 2xCPUs, 8cores/CPU, 64GB RAM, running an 
installation v2.7 with Apache Spark v2.1.0
as a low-cost configuration for handling data exploration when dealing with huge amount of 
inputs; raw data volumes, for batch analysis, were approximately 
 
 
Figure 1.  Logs from different input sources
 
3. GLOBAL FLATTENING V
 
The first question to be answered is related to the ability to define an optimal way to handle such 
complex inputs. Potential solutions may include:
 
• use the full number of dimensions (i.e. all the available features in each record), defined 
as global flattening 
• decomposing initial logs into distinct baseline structures derived by each sensor/tool, 
defined as local flattening 
 
3.1. LOOKING FOR THREATS 
 
In order to answer to these questions, we should
next steps. While working with the analysis of heterogeneous data taken from different sources, 
pre-process procedures, such as 
need to be carefully designed in order not to miss any security
tasks are usually time-consuming producing thus significant delays to the overall time of th
analysis.  
 
That is our main motivation in this work: to reduce the time needed for feature extraction in data 
exploration analysis by automating the process. In order to achieve it, we 
a telco network. For the pre-processing analysis 
Apache Hadoo
 as a Standalone Cluster Mode, which can be regarded 
16TBytes. 
 
S. LOCAL FLATTENING 
 
 
AND ATTACKS IN A KILL CHAIN 
 also take into account the rationale behind the 
feature extraction, feature selection and feature transformation, 
-related significant events. These 
utilize the data model 
 
41 
p 
 
e data 
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abstractions and we keep to a minimum any access to the actual data. The key characteristics of 
data inputs follow:  
 
• logs derived from different sources 
• heterogeneous data 
• high-level of complexity 
• information is usually hidden in multi-level complex structures  
 
In the next stage, features will be transformed, indexed and scaled to overcome skewness, by 
following usually a normal distribution under a common metric space, in the form of vectors. As 
in our experiments we processed mainly un-labelled data (i.e. lack of any labels or any indication 
of a suspicious threat/attack), clustering techniques will be used to define baseline behavioural 
profiles and to detect outliers [1]. The latter may correspond to rare, sparse anomalies, that can be 
found by either first-class detection of novelties,n-gram analysis of nested attributes and pattern 
analysis using Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) [8] [6]. A survey on unsupervised learning 
outlier detection algorithms is presented in [14]. Finally, semi-supervised or/and supervised 
analysis can be further employed by using cluster labels, anomalous clusters, or experts feedback 
(using active learning methods), in order to detect and/or predict threats and attacks in near- and 
real-time analysis [3]. 
 
Outliers in time-series are expected to be found for a: 
 
• single network sensor or pen-tester 
• a subset of those, or 
• by taking into account the complete available set of sensors and network monitoring tools 
 
These time-series are defined in terms of either: 
 
• time spaces as the contextual attributes  
• date attributes will be decomposed to time windows such as year, month, day of a 
week, hour and minute, following the approach proposed in [13]  
• statistics will be calculated either for batch or online mode and then will be stored 
in HIVE tables, or in temporary views for ad-hoc temporal real-time analysis. 
• a single time space (e.g. a specific day) 
• a stable window time space (e.g. all days for a specific month) 
• a user-defined variable window time space  
 
Our approach serves as an adaptation of the kill-chain model. The kill chain model [2] is an 
intelligence-driven, threat-focused approach to study intrusions from the adversaries’ perspective. 
The fundamental element is the indicator which corresponds to any piece of information that can 
describe a threat or an attack. Indicators can be either atomic such as IP or email addresses, 
computed such as hash values or regular expressions, or behavioral which are collections of 
computed and atomic indicators such as statements.  
 
Thus, in our proposal, contextual attributes represent either time-spaces in time-series, as the first 
level of interest, single attributes (e.g. a specific network protocol, or a user or any other atomic 
indicator), computed attributes (e.g. hash values or regular expressions), or even behavioral 
attributes of inner structure (e.g. collections of single and computed attributes in the form of 
statements or nested records). Then, outliers can be defined for multiple levels of interest for the 
remain behavioral attributes, by looking into single vector values [4], or by looking for the 
covariance and pairwise correlation (e.g. Pearson correlation) in a subset of the selected features 
or the complete set of features [5]. 
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Experiments with data received from different network monitoring tools regarding the system of a 
telco enterprise, at the exploratory data stage revealed that the number of single feature attributes 
in this log were between a range of 7 (the smallest number of attributes of a distinct feature space) 
up to 99 attributes (corresponding to the total number of the overall available feature space). A 
fact, that led us to carry on with feature extraction by focusing on flattening multi-nested records 
separately for each different structure (under a number of 13 different baseline structures). 
Thus, the main keys in the proposed approach for feature extraction are: 
 
• extract the right data  
• correlation of the ’right data’ can reveal long-term APTs  
• re-usable patterns and trend lines as probabilities are indications of zero-day 
attacks  
• trend lines may also be used to detect DDoS attacks  
• handle interoperability issues  
• handle time inconsistencies, date formats, different names for the same piece of 
information, by extending the NLP python library [2] 
 
3.2. GLOBAL FLATTENING OF INPUT DATA 
 
By following this approach, we achieve a full-view of entities behavior as each row is represented 
by the full set of dimensions. On the other hand, the majority of the columns do not have a value 
or it is set to Null. A candidate solution would be to use sparse vectors in the next stage of feature 
transformation, which in turn demands special care for NaN and Null values (for example, 
replace them either with the mean, the median, or with a special value). Most of the data in this 
stage are categorical. We need to convert them into numerical in the next stages, as in Spark, 
statistical analytics are available only for data in the form of a Vector or of the DoubleType.  
 
This solution performs efficiently for a rather small number of dimensions while it suffers from 
the well-known phenomenon of the curse of dimensionality for a high number of dimensions, 
where data appear to be sparse and dissimilar in several ways, which prevents common data 
modelling strategies from being efficient. 
 
3.3. LOCAL FLATTENING OF INPUT DATA 
 
By following this approach, we identify all the different schemas in input data. First, it is a 
bottom-up analysis by re-sythesing results to answer to either simple of complex questions. In the 
same time, we can define hypotheses to the full set of our input data (i.e. top-down analysis) thus, 
it is a complete approach in data analytics, by allowing data to tell their story, in a concrete way, 
following a minimum number of steps. In this way, we are able to: 
 
• keep the number of assumptions to a minimum   
• look for misconfigurations and data correlations into the abstract dataframes definitions  
• keep access to the actual data to a minimum   
• provide solutions in interoperability problems, such as: 
• different representations of date attributes 
• namespace inconsistencies (e.g. attributes with names such as prot, protocol, 
connectionProtocol)   
• cope with complex structures of different number of inner levels   
• deal with event ordering and time-inconsistencies (as it is described in [10]) 
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4. FEATURE EXTRACTION 
 
In Apache Spark, data are organized
relational tables: there are columns (aka attributes or features or dimensions) and rows (i.e. events 
recorded, for example, by a network sensor, or 
corresponded datatypes define the schema of a dataframe. In each dataframe, its columns and 
rows i.e. its schema is unchangeable. Thus, an example of a schema could be the following:
DataFrame[id: string, @timestamp: string, honeypot: string, payloadCommand: string]
A sample of recorded events of this dataframe schema is shown in Figure 2:
 
 
Figure 2. A sample of recorded events, having 4 columns/dimensions
 
The following steps refer to the case in which logs/datasets are ingested i
approach examines the data structures on their top
synthesis of previous and new dataframes, in an automatic way. Access to the actual data is only 
taken place when there is a need to find schemas in 
the records (thus, even if we have a dataframe of million/billions of events, we only examine the 
schema of the first record/event).
data: a data frame column. 
 
1) load the log file in a spark data
2) find and remove all single-valued attributes 
section) 
3) flatten complex structures 
a) find and flatten all columns of complex structure (th
the lowest complex attribute of the hierarchy of complex attributes)
i) e.g. struct, nested dictionaries, linked
their value is of Row
b) remove all the original columns o
4) convert all time-columns into timestamps, using distinct time features in the data
5) integrate similar features in the list of data
 
Each attribute of a complex structure, such as of a 
array, is handled in such way, which
the elements of an array, a dictionary, a list, etc.) will be
way, we manage to transform the schema of the
each one corresponding to a schema that refers to a single network sensor or other input data 
source, as it is illustrated in the following figures (Figures 3, 4,
different cases follow: 
• struct – RowType 
• use the leaf column at the last level of this struct
column 
• list: add list elements as new columns
IN APACHE SPARK 
 in the form of dataframes, which resemble the well
a specific device). The list of columns and their 
 
 
 
n json
-level, focusing on abstract schemas and re
dictionaries and only by retrieving just one of 
 The words field, attribute or column refer to the same piece of 
 frame, in json format 
(this step applies also to the feature selectio
e steps are run recursively, down to 
 
 lists, arrays, etc. (i.e. currently those which 
 Type) 
f complex structure 
 frames 
struct, nested dictionary, linked
 ensures that all single attributes of the lowest data level (i.e. 
 flattened and expressed in 2
 original dataframe to a number of dataframes, 
 5 and 6). The steps, for
-column to add it as a new 
 
 
44 
-known 
 
 
 format. Our 
-
n 
 frames 
 list or an 
-D.In this 
 these 
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• array: split array’s elements and add the relevant new columns
• dictionary - steps: 
• find all inner schemas for attributes of type Dict, as a list
• add the schemaType as an ind
• create a list of dataframes, where each one has its own distinct schema
• flatten all dictionary
the list of dataframes by adding them as new columns
 
In Figure 3, in the left-hand schema
value is given by the inner-level attribute
the actual date value can be searched in the inner
$oid and $date are extracted in the form of two new columns, named 
original attributes _id and timestamp are then de
side, Schema#2. In this way, we achieved to reduce the complexity of the original input schema to 
a new one of lower complexity. 
 
 
Figure 3. Transforming complex fields (i) 
 
In Figure 3, the exploratory analysis has revealed that the 
dictionary as a list of multi-nested dictionaries; each one of the latter present a complex structure 
with further levels. These different schemas found in payload are presented in Figure 4.
 
 
Figure 4
 
 
ex to the original dataframe 
 attributes, according to their schemas, in each dataframe of 
 
Schema#1, attributes _id is of the datatype struct
, $oid. The same stands for the outer attribute 
-level attribute $date. In both cases, attributes 
_id_ and 
leted, having thus a new schema on the right
– attributes _id and timestamp are of the datatype 
payload attribute represents actually a 
. Different schemas in the payload attribute 
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. The actual 
timestamp: 
dateOut; the 
-
 
struct 
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In Figure 5, we illustrate the new
schemas of the payload attribute in Figure 4. By following this approach, data are easier to be 
handled: in the next stages, they will be cleaned, transformed from categorical to numerical and 
then they will be further analyzed in order to detect anomalies in entities 
 
The dataframe schema in Figure 6
payload attribute (Figure 5) into its inner
an array. By applying consecutive transformations automatically, we manage to extract all inner 
attributes, which simplifies the process of correlating data in the next stage. Thus, by looking into 
the raw_sig column, we identify inner v
new features derived by the inner levels, as it is depicted e.g. for column 
be further split by leading to two new columns (e.g. with values 
process is recursive and automated; special care is given how we name the new columns, in order 
to follow the different paths of attributes decomposition.
 
Figure 5. The new-created dataframes which correspond
-created dataframes schemas which correspond to the different 
behavior. 
 is the second of the dataframes derived by flattening the 
-level attributes. Here, feature raw_sig is in the form of 
alues separated by ‘:’, which further are decomposed into 
attsCol5; the latter could 
1024 and 0, respectively), as 
 
 
 to the different schemas in payload
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International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA) Vol.9, No.6, November 2017
 
 
Figure 6. Transforming complex fields (ii
 
5. FEATURE SELECTION 
 
The process of feature selection 
3.1, our motivation in our approach is to 
reduction of the time needed for applying security analytics in un
ultimately to detect anomalies as strong form 
such as, to increase accuracy and
need to select the data that are more related to our questions. 
significant role in complex event processing, especially when d
sources and different forms. 
 
We present four methods to achieve this goal:
 
1. Leave-out single-value attributes
2. Namespace correlation 
3. Data correlation using the actual values
4. FS in case of having a relative small number of 
 
5.1. LEAVE-OUT SINGLE-VALUE 
 
The first method is quite simple: all single
dataframe. For example, consider the 
datatype Boolean takes the value 
drop the relevant column, which leads to a new dataframe schema.
i) – attributes raw_sig is of the datatype array
(FS) is crucial for the next analysis steps. As was explained in 
reduce data complexity in parallel with a significant 
-labelled data. As we are aiming 
of outliers in order to improve quantitative metrics 
 detection rates or to decrease security noise to a minimum
Dimensionality reduction can play a 
ata are coming from different 
 
 
 
categories 
ATTRIBUTES 
-valued attributes are removed from the original 
dataframe schema in Figure 7. Attribute normalized
True for all the events in our integrated log and therefore we 
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, we 
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Figure 7. Attribute normalized
 
5.2. NAMESPACE CORRELATION
 
It is quite common when data inputs are coming from different sources to deal with entity 
attributes which refer to the same piece of information although their names are slightly different.
For example, attributes proto and 
communication channel. Different tools used by experts to monitor network traffic do not follow 
a unified namespace scheme. This fact, could lead to misinterpretations, information redundancy 
and misconfigurations in data modelling, among other obstacles in data exploration stage; all 
these refer mainly to problems in interoperability, as can be seen in Figure 8. By solving such 
inconsistencies, we achieve to further reduce data complexity as well as to reduce
for data analysis. In [10] we have presented an approach to
utilizing means derived by the theory of categories.
 
 
Figure 8. Attributes proto
 
5.3. USING PEARSON CORRELATION 
 
As long as data inputs, in the for
into their corresponding numerical values, and before the process of forming the actual 
vectors that will be used in clustering, by using data correlation, we are able to achieve a further 
reduction of the dimensions that will be used for the actual security
 
The outcome of applying this technique, using 
Attributes highly correlated may be omitted while defining the relevant clusters; the choice of the 
particular attribute to be left out is strongly related to the actual research of interest. For example, 
 is left out as it presents a constant value of True in all records
 
connection protocol refer to the actual protocol used in a 
 the overa
 handle such interoperability issues by 
 
 and connection_protocol refer to the same piece of data
TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF DIMENSIONS
m of dataframes, are cleaned, transformed, indexed and scaled 
 analytics. 
Pearson correlation, is presented in Figure 9. 
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we are interested to monitor the 
patterns of normal behavior. 
 
 
Figure 9. Applying Pearson correlation to indexed and scaled data for feature selection
 
5.4. FEATURE SELECTION IN 
CATEGORIES 
 
In case where we deal with categorical attributes presenting a relative small number of categories, 
i.e. numberOfCategories<= 4, we propose the following steps in order to achieve a further 
feature reduction. We distinguish the case
a security-related event) and the case where some or all the labels are available
mention that in real scenarios, 
highly-unbalanced data (i.e. where only few instances of the rare/anomalous class are available).
Working with un-labelled data: 
 
• For the set of these features, select each one of them as the feature
either: 
• Use a decision tree with a 
number of the dimensions (by following one or more of the aforementioned techniques)
• Create 2n sub-dataframes with respect to the number of categories
• Calculate features importance using a 
• Use an ensemble technique in the form of a 
classifier, running a combination of the above techniques to optimize results in the next 
levels of the analysis (e.g. to further optimize detection rates)
 
behavior in local hosts and to detect any anomalies deviate by 
CASE OF HAVING A RELATIVE SMALL N
s where data are un-labelled (lack of any indication f
.
usually we need to cope with either fully un-labelled data or 
-label attribute and then 
multi-class classification evaluator to further reduce the 
 
Random Forest classifier 
Combiner e.g. a neural network
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UMBER OF 
or 
 We need to 
 
 
 or a Bayes 
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Working with labelled data: 
 
• Select features using the Chi-Square test of independencies. In our experiments, with 
respect to the input data, we have used four different statistical methods, available in 
Spark ML library: 
• The number of top features 
• A fraction of the top features 
• p-values below a threshold to control the false positive rate 
• p-values with false discovery rate below a threshold 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have presented an approach to handle efficiently the tasks of feature extraction and feature 
selection while working with security analytics by utilizing machine learning techniques. It is an 
automated solution to handle interoperability problems. It is based on a continuous transformation 
of the abstract definitions of the data inputs. 
 
In the case of feature extraction, access to the actual data is limited to a minimum read actions of 
the first record of a dataframe and only when it is needed to extract the inner schema of a 
dictionary-based attribute. In the case of feature selection, the actual data are accessed only to 
find correlations between them, before we apply clustering or any other method for threat 
detection. 
 
By following the proposed approach, we managed to achieve our primary objectives: reduce 
computational time, reduce data complexity and provide solutions to interoperability issues, while 
analyzing vast amount of heterogeneous data from different sources. 
The approach can be formalized in the next steps by utilizing novel structures derived from the 
theory of categories as it has been presented in [10] towards an overall optimization, in terms of 
quantitative and qualitative metrics. 
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